2 most claimant-friendly in the world. Under it, the claimant has a prima facie case once he has established that the defendant has published a defamatory statement about him. He does not have to prove that the statement is false (though the defendant has a good défense if he can prove it is true) and he does not have to prove that the defendant acted out of malice. Damages can be high by international standards. No wonder that the rich and the famous come from the four corners of the globe to bring libel actions in England.
The problem is that if English courts assume jurisdiction in too wide a range of cases (and if they apply English law), countries that give more weight to free speech could legitimately complain that the English courts were undermining their freedoms.
Our first task, therefore, is to examine English conflict-of-laws rules in libel actions in order to ascertain whether they achieve a fair balance between the competing interests.
II. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
The problem has both a choice-of-law element and a jurisdictional element. We will consider the choice-of-law element first, though, as we shall see, jurisdiction is actually more important. Before we consider either, however, a point of terminology must be explained.
A. Terminology
In English legal terminology, each time an item is communicated to another person, there is a "publication". Each sale of a newspaper is a separate publication in English eyes; and each time a viewer watches a television program there is also a "publication". 4 The place of publication is the place where this occurs. If a French newspaper sells even a single copy in England, there is publication in England (as well as in France); the same is true if a French radio station makes a broadcast that is heard in England. Lawyers from Continental Europe usually use different terminology. They would say that the French newspaper was "published" in France and was merely "distributed" in England. 5 Readers from the Continent should be aware that English lawyers use these terms differently.
B. No "Single-Publication" Rule
Unlike the United States, 6 England does not apply a "single-publication" rule. The principle that each communication of the offending material constitutes a separate tort applies with regard to choice of law, jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. This means that the applicable law may be different with regard to publication in different countries and that the English courts may have jurisdiction with regard to those torts founded on publication in
England, but not with regard to those torts founded on publication in other countries. but again defamation was excluded. 9 The result is that the common law still applies.
C. Choice of Law
Under the general common-law rule applied in England for choice of law in tort, a tort committed in a foreign country will be actionable in England if, and only if, it is actionable under the foreign law (it must be civilly actionable: it is not enough if is a criminal offence) and it is actionable as a tort under English law (the so-called "doubleactionability" rule). 10 Where the tort is committed in England, on the other hand, English law alone will be applied.
11
It follows from this, that if the claimant limits his claim to a remedy for publication in England -as he invariably does, for jurisdictional reasons if for no othersthe court will apply English law alone. Foreign publication, even if much more significant than English publication, will be ignored. This is one of the consequences of the English concept of publication and the view that each publication constitutes a separate tort.
D. Jurisdiction
7 Sections 9(3), 10 and 13. Regulation, 16 a provision which confers jurisdiction on the courts for the place where the "harmful event" occurred.
The European Court held that, in international libel cases in which jurisdiction is claimed under Article 5(3), the claimant may bring proceedings either in the courts for the place where the material is distributed or in the courts for the place where the publisher is "established". This latter concept will generally coincide with domicile and need not concern us further. Where jurisdiction is based on distribution (publication), the claim must be limited to damage flowing from the copies of the publication distributed in the territory of the forum.
Defendant not domiciled in a Member State
At present, English rules of jurisdiction apply when the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State. Under these, jurisdiction may be obtained either by serving a writ on the defendant during his temporary presence in England (a ground of jurisdiction that rarely applies in libel cases), 17 or by serving it outside the jurisdiction under Section IV, Part 6, of the English Civil Procedure Rules and Practice Direction 6B, rule 3(1)(9). Rule 3(1)(9), which was derived from ECJ case-law, 18 provides for jurisdiction, where the claim is made in tort, if either (a) damage was sustained within the jurisdiction, or (b) the damage 16 At the time, the relevant provision was Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention, which was expressed in identical terms. 17 If there was no publication in England, the action would be stayed on the ground of forum non conveniens. If there was such publication, the same thing would probably happen unless the claim was limited to damages resulting from publication in England. sustained resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction. As applied to libel, it gives jurisdiction only with regard to items published (distributed) in England. 19 The result is that the jurisdictional rules are much the same under both EU law and under English law.
There is, however, one difference. Where jurisdiction is derived from English law, the doctrine of forum non conveniens applies. 20 Under this, English courts stay the proceedings if the courts of another country are a clearly more appropriate forum.
However, if the claimant limits his claim to a remedy for publication in England, the English courts will apply forum non conveniens solely on the basis of such publication.
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Publication outside England will not be taken into consideration. Since England does not have a "single-publication" rule, the English courts will not lump together all instances in which the material is communicated and apply forum non conveniens on that basis. 22 The result is that the courts inevitably conclude that England is the most appropriate forum for granting a remedy for publication in England.
The only exception is where the claimant has no substantial reputation in England. However, libel claimants are usually international business persons, film stars, pop singers or sportsmen: if they do not have a great deal of money they will not be able 19 If publication in England was minimal, the court might strike out the proceedings for abuse of process: This might still not be regarded as a problem since, under both EC and English law, the remedy must be limited to damages resulting from publication in England. The problem is that it is not possible in practice to limit the scope of the remedy so that it does not have an impact on publication in other countries. In the realm of information, the world is one unit: individual countries cannot be isolated from the rest. ordered to pay costs. The total sum is said to have been almost £115,000 (at the then exchange rate this was something in the region of $200,000, more than €135,000). In addition, an injunction was issued requiring Ehrenfeld and her publisher not to publish the material in England.
Since the damages awarded -for the distribution of just 23 copies of the bookwere far greater than the likely profits from publication worldwide, the effect of the award, if known in advance, would have been to deter the author from publishing at all.
Moreover, the defendants were ordered not to publish the material in England. This injunction would have required the material not to be put on the Internet and hard copies 39 For this purpose, it is reasonable to regard the United States as a single unit, rather than to look at the individual US state in question, since the protection of free speech, being largely a matter of constitutional law, is a national concern. If individual states gave even greater protection, a further analysis at the state level might be necessary.
The first situation is the easiest one. If the claimant is domiciled in the United
States and the defendant is domiciled in England, there is no problem. The United States has no interest in the protection of the free speech of a person domiciled in England. If
English courts want to take jurisdiction and to apply English law, that does not affect American interests. There is, therefore, no need to change the law in this situation.
If, on the other hand, the claimant and defendant are both domiciled in the United
States, the US has a great interest in protecting the free speech of the defendant and
England has no interest in protecting the reputation of the claimant. So here, American interests should prevail. The only exception is that if the defendant goes out of his or her way to target England so that publication is England is clearly more significant than that in any other country of the world, England would have a legitimate interest in granting a remedy, at least if the defendant had a significant reputation in England.
A similar analysis could be made where the defendant is domiciled in the United
States and the claimant is domiciled in a third country, except perhaps where a fair trial could not be expected in the claimant's country.
We now come to the most difficult situation. This is where the claimant is domiciled in England and the defendant is domiciled in the US. Here each country has a legitimate interest in protecting its own person. The United States would want to protect the free speech of the defendant; England would want to protect the reputation of the claimant. No reconciliation is possible. Provided there is publication in England, English courts would take jurisdiction and apply English law. They cannot be criticized for that.
American courts would refuse to recognize the resulting judgment (and possibly grant declarations). They cannot be criticized for that. To this extent, legislation such as that in New York is not unreasonable.
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What can we conclude from this analysis? It is suggested that the law applied by English courts (whether English or EU law) should be changed so as to give effect to the superior interest of foreign countries in cases where neither party is domiciled in England and the defendant has not specially targeted England.
VI. HOW IS THIS TO BE DONE?
Finding a practical solution is not straightforward, since two branches of conflict of laws -choice of law and jurisdiction -are involved, and two jurisdictions -England and the European Union -might have to take action.
A. Choice of Law
40 Treble damages, however, are another matter. Legislation along these lines would invite retaliation. The vehicle for such retaliation is already at hand. Section 6 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980 contains a "claw-back" provision allowing a person who has been required to pay treble damages in another country to claim them back from the person to whom they were paid. Any such judgment would be recognized in the European Union, the Lugano States (see note 13*, above), and Australia. For the European Union, see the Brussels I Regulation, Chapter III; for the Lugano States, the equivalent provisions of the Lugano Convention (see note 13*, above); for Australia, the Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984, section 12.
At the present time, a solution based on choice of law would have to come from England, since the matter is at present governed by English law. However, the EU measure on choice of law in tort (the Rome II Regulation) 41 should in principle cover choice of law for defamation. It was excluded only because it was impossible to find a solution that was acceptable to all concerned. This is not the end of the matter, however, since the EC Commission is supposed to be undertaking a study with a view to further legislation.
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One day, a solution might be found and incorporated into the Regulation.
It is not easy to formulate a clear-cut rule -the kind preferred by Continental conflicts lawyers -for insertion into the Rome II Regulation. Of the various possibilities originally considered, the application of the law of the claimant's domicile had some initial support. However, it proved unacceptable because of the serious problems that could result: for example, it might be impossible for the press to criticize a foreign dictator if the law of his country declared that any such criticism was ipso facto defamatory.
If a solution were to come from a change of English law, a more nuanced approach would be possible. Perhaps the best one could come up with would be a rule such as the following: (c) The applicable law for the tort of defamation shall be the law of the country with which the tort is most closely connected.
While admittedly vague, this at least requires the court to consider the worldwide picture, even if the claim is limited to publication in England. In effect, it establishes a singlepublication rule for choice of law. A rule along these lines might one day be introduced by the courts, though this is far from certain. If legislation were to be adopted, it would have to be a statute, since there is no other way in which it could be done. The problem here is that the legislative timetable in Parliament is usually congested with more urgent business and "mere" law reform is often pushed to the back of the queue.
In addition, a solution through choice of law gives rise to other difficulties. The first is that, in a field such as defamation, values and attitudes are often as important as the black-letter rule. Moreover, English judges might be unwilling to apply some aspects of US law on public-policy grounds. For these reasons, US law applied by an English court might be significantly different from US law applied by an American court.
A second problem is that the vague and open-ended character of the rule could give rise to extensive litigation. Many defendants might be unable to afford this. If a foreign defendant is financially unable to defend a case on the merits, he or she is unlikely to be able to fight a series of appeals on choice-of-law issues. For these reasons, a solution through choice of law is unlikely to prove satisfactory.
B. Jurisdiction
At present, EU law (the Brussels I Regulation) 43 applies only when the defendant is domiciled in an EU Member State. So a change here would not do much to help defendants from the US or other non-European countries. However, there is a plan to extend its scope to cover at least some situations in which the defendant is domiciled outside the EU. If this happens, EU law may become the main focus of attention for finding a solution to the problem of libel tourism.
EU law
If a change to EU law were contemplated, it would not be possible to find a solution through forum non conveniens, since its unpredictability makes it unacceptable to EU lawyers. Nor would a flexible jurisdictional rule be acceptable. Something clear-cut and precise would have to be devised. As was said above, there are two provisions that could apply to defamation proceedings. The first, Article 2(1), gives jurisdiction to the Member State in which the defendant is domiciled. Since this causes no problems, it does not have to be changed.
The second is Article 5(3), which was discussed above. 44 This gives jurisdiction to the courts for the place where the "harmful event" occurred. This should be retained, but it should be limited in the case of defamation. The following is a possibility:
In the case of non-contractual obligations 45 arising out of violations of privacy and rights relating to personality, including defamation, 46 Article 5(3) shall apply only if -(a) the claimant is domiciled in the territory of the forum; or (b) the defendant has taken significant steps to make the offending material available in the country of the forum and has targeted that country more than any other.
This would apply in addition to jurisdiction based on the domicile of the defendant.
English law
Under English law, a solution could be found either through a change in the way in which forum non conveniens is applied, or by a change in the rules of jurisdiction. As regards forum non conveniens, the problem is that, if the claim is limited to a remedy for publication 44 See text to note 16.* 45 "Non-contractual obligations" is the term used in EU law. Its main component is tort, though it covers other matters as well. 46 This is the definition used in the Rome II Regulation for the purpose of excluding libel actions. See note 9* above and the text thereto.
in England, the courts take into account only such publication. 47 What is needed is some kind of single-publication rule for this purpose. This might be introduced through a change in case law: the present rule rests on decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal; 48 these could be overruled by the House of Lords. If legislation were to be adopted, this could probably be done through an amendment to the Civil Procedure Rules, something that would be much easier to do than to pass a statute. As regards a change in the rules of jurisdiction, an amendment could be made to Practice Direction 6B, rule 3(1)(9), 49 perhaps along the lines of the proposed amendment to Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
What has been said shows that a reasonable solution to the problem is possible. However, it is unlikely that legislation would be introduced either in England or in the European Union unless there is a clearly felt need to do so. This is unlikely to be the case unless those affected make out a case on the political level.
47 See text to notes 20-23*, above. 
